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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge: 
 
This matter comes on before this court on defendant 
Douglas R. Colkitt's appeal from the district court's order 
for summary judgment in favor of plaintiff GFL Advantage 
Fund, Ltd. against Colkitt entered on April 25, 2000, and 
on appeal from an order entered on July 17, 2000, denying 
reconsideration of the April 25 order. For the reasons stated 




A. FACTUAL HISTORY 
 
Douglas Colkitt, who earned both his medical degree and 
MBA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1979, is the 
founder and majority shareholder of two small 
capitalization medical services businesses -- EquiMed, Inc. 
("EquiMed") and National Medical Financial Services 
Corporation ("National Medical"). As of February 1996, 
Colkitt held 20,783,633 (73%) of EquiMed's 28,589,717 
outstanding shares of common stock, and as of May 1996, 
he owned 2.8 million (38%) of National Medical's 7,426,844 
outstanding shares of common stock. See GFL Advantage 
Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, No. 4:CV-97-0526, Memorandum and 
Order at 4 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2000). 
 
Beginning in 1996, Colkitt sought financing to pursue 
various business ventures unrelated to EquiMed and 
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National Medical. After unsuccessfully attempting to secure 
financing from traditional commercial lending institutions, 
Colkitt contacted alternative lenders that might be willing 
to structure "convertible or exchange transactions," 
whereby Colkitt would be able immediately to convert his 
vast stockholdings into cash. In particular, Colkitt 
endeavored to borrow money by pledging his common stock 
as collateral and providing the lender with the right to 
convert or exchange the debt for the shares pledged by 
Colkitt. 
 
In the spring of 1996, Colkitt's broker identified GFL 
Advantage Fund, Ltd. ("GFL") as a possible lender, and on 
May 24, 1996, Colkitt obtained a loan of $3,000,000 from 
GFL. Under the terms of the note ("National Medical note"), 
GFL had the right after 30 days of the date of the note to 
exchange up to $1.5 million of its outstanding principal for 
shares of National Medical stock held by Colkitt at an 
exchange rate of 82% of the average market price. GFL 
could exchange the remainder of the unpaid balance for 
shares of National Medical 60 days after the date of the 
note. The average market price was computed by taking the 
average of the stock's closing prices for the five days 
immediately prior to the exchange request. In essence, the 
note gave GFL the right to require Colkitt to repay the loan 
with National Medical stock valued at a discount of 18% of 
the five-day average closing price, thus giving GFL an 
immediate paper profit as it would receive stock with a 
premium value to repay a debt of a lesser amount. 
 
Several months later on August 5, 1996, Colkitt entered 
into a similar transaction with GFL for a $10,000,000 loan. 
The structure of the second note ("EquiMed note") was akin 
to that of the National Medical note, except the parties 
agreed that GFL could convert the debt into shares of 
Colkitt's other business, EquiMed, Inc., at an exchange rate 
of 83% of the average market price. In addition, GFL could 
convert up to $5 million of the outstanding principal after 
60 days of the date of the note and could convert the 
balance of the principal 30 days thereafter. 
 
Nearly four months after issuing the initial $3,000,000 
loan to Colkitt, GFL made its first of six exchange demands 
for National Medical stock. On September 13, 1996, GFL 
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exchanged $250,000 of debt for 34,130 shares of National 
Medical stock at the average market price of $9.20 and an 
exchange or conversion price of $7.32. On September 19, 
1996, GFL exchanged $135,000 of loan principal for 18,726 
shares at an average market price of $9.075 and a 
conversion price of $7.21. On October 10, 1996, GFL 
converted $257,000 of debt into 47,081 shares at an 
average closing price of $6.925 and a conversion price of 
$5.46. On December 5, 1996, GFL exchanged $100,000 of 
unpaid principal for 14,845 shares at an average market 
price of $8.725 and an exchange price of $6.74. On 
December 19, 1996, GFL converted $200,000 of debt into 
34,588 shares at an average market price of $7.525 and a 
conversion price of $5.78. Finally, on January 7, 1997, GFL 
demanded an exchange of $545,000 of loan principal for 
100,223 shares, but the request was withdrawn after 
Colkitt dishonored GFL's earlier exchange demand for 
EquiMed stock. 
 
GFL waited until November 1996, more than 3 months 
after the date of the EquiMed note, before making its first 
exchange demand for EquiMed shares. On November 27, 
1996, GFL demanded that Colkitt convert $560,000 in 
outstanding principal into EquiMed stock. With a five-day 
average closing price of $4.50, GFL received 150,555 shares 
of EquiMed at an exchange rate price of $3.72. GFL's next 
exchange demand for EquiMed stock occurred on January 
3, 1997, when GFL sought to convert $1,430,000 in unpaid 
principal, but Colkitt dishonored the request. 
 
Unknown to Colkitt at the time, and on the same day in 
September 1996 as GFL's first exchange demand for 
National Medical stock, GFL began short selling National 
Medical stock. As we have explained: 
 
       Short selling is accomplished by selling stock which 
       the investor does not yet own; normally this is done by 
       borrowing shares from a broker at an agreed upon fee 
       or rate of interest . . . . The short seller is obligated, 
       however, to buy an equivalent number of shares in 
       order to return the borrowed shares . . . . Herein lies 
       the short seller's potential for profit: if the price of 
       stock declines after the short sale, he does not need all 
       the funds to make this covering purchase; the short 
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       seller then pockets the difference. On the other hand, 
       there is no limit to the short seller's potential loss: if 
       the price of the stock rises, so too does the short 
       seller's loss, and since there is no cap to a stock's 
       price, there is no limitation on the short seller's risk. 
 
Zlotnick v. Tie Communications, 836 F.2d 818, 820 (3d Cir. 
1988). See also 17 C.F.R. S 240.3b-3 (defining short sale as 
"any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any 
sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security 
borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller"); Black's Law 
Dictionary 1339 (7th ed. 1999) (defining short sale as the 
"sale of a security that the seller does not own or has not 
contracted for at the time of sale, and that the seller must 
borrow to make delivery"). In other words, short sellers are 
betting that the stock price will decline between the time 
they sell the borrowed stock and the time they must 
"cover," i.e., purchase replacement shares to repay the 
borrowed stock. Short selling, which is closely regulated, 
see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. S 240.10a-1, is a legitimate trading 
strategy for stocks that traders believe are overvalued. 
 
GFL's first short sale of National Medical stock occurred 
on September 13, 1996, when it sold 32,500 shares at a 
price of $10.00 per share. On September 16, 1996, GFL 
sold short 15,000 shares of National Medical at $9.13 per 
share. On September 17, 1996, GFL sold short 5,000 
shares at $9.25 per share. On October 11, 1996, GFL sold 
short 3,000 shares at $8.25 per share. Finally, on October 
14, 1996, GFL sold short 7,000 shares of National Medical 
at $8.25 per share. GFL sold short a total of 62,500 shares 
of National Medical stock over a one-month period. 
 
GFL also sold EquiMed shares short. On November 8, 
1996, GFL sold short a total of 18,400 shares of EquiMed 
-- 10,000 shares at $5.50 per share and 8,400 shares at 
$5.48 per share. On November 11, 1996, GFL sold short 
32,500 shares at $5.38 per share. On November 12, 1996, 
GFL sold short 16,000 shares at $5.25 per share. On 
November 14, 1996, GFL sold short 8,500 shares at $5.25 
per share. Finally, on November 22, 1996, GFL sold short 
3,300 shares of EquiMed stock at $5.00 per share. Over 
this two-week period in November 1996, GFL sold short a 
total of 78,700 shares of EquiMed stock. 
 
                                5 
 
 
GFL explains that it engaged in short sales of National 
Medical and EquiMed stock as a hedging strategy against 
"delivery risk." Under the terms of the notes, the exchange 
price was based on the average closing price during the five 
trading days preceding the exchange request. 
Consequently, the exchange price was locked in on the date 
of the exchange request, thus shifting onto GFL the risk 
that the stock's price would drop more than the 17% or 
18% discount. In other words, "if the stock price dropped 
more than the agreed-upon discount before GFL was able 
to sell the exchanged shares, GFL would be in a loss 
position." Br. of Appellee at 7. GFL claims it sold short to 
protect itself in the event that the price of the stock 
declined further after GFL made the exchange request but 
before GFL was able to sell the shares. 
 
The theory of Colkitt's case, however, is that GFL sold 
National Medical and EquiMed shares short in an effort to 
depress the prices of the stocks. Indeed, Colkitt contends 
that the market price of National Medical dropped 17.5% 
between GFL's first and last short sales of National Medical 
stock, and that the market price of EquiMed declined by 
18.5% between GFL's first short sale of EquiMed stock and 
GFL's first exchange demand.1 Colkitt argues that GFL 
purposely depressed the stock prices so that Colkitt would 
be forced to exchange more shares to retire the same 
amount of debt. He asserts that GFL was able to obtain an 
additional 27,882 shares of EquiMed and an additional 
11,658 shares of National Medical due to the respective 
declines in the stocks' prices. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Inexplicably, Colkitt measures the price decline of EquiMed stock 
during the period between GFL's first short sale on November 8, 1996, 
and GFL's first exchange demand on November 27, 1996, rather than 
between GFL's first short sale on November 8, 1996, and its last short 
sale on November 22, 1996. As GFL points out, however, if the price 
decline of EquiMed stock is measured during the period between GFL's 
first and last short sales, EquiMed's price drop would be approximately 
2%. See Br. of Appellee at 36. More specifically, the price of EquiMed on 
the day of the first short trade on November 8 was $5.25 per share, 
whereas the price on the day of the last short sale on November 22 was 
$5.13. See id. at 36 n.13. This $.12 drop represents only a 2.3% 
decrease. 
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As noted above, Colkitt refused to honor GFL's exchange 
request for EquiMed shares on January 3, 1997. Instead, 
Colkitt notified GFL in December 1996 and early January 
1997 that he intended to prepay all unpaid principal and 
interest in cash. Colkitt contends that GFL improperly 
rejected his request to prepay the unpaid balance, even 
though the notes contemplated such prepayment. GFL 
responds that it did not reject outright Colkitt's offer to 
prepay, but rather refused to allow Colkitt to dictate the 
terms of any prepayment and disagreed with Colkitt about 
the amounts due. GFL admits that it does not believe that 
Colkitt had a right to prepay, but insists that it"accepted 
Colkitt's offer to prepay whatever amount Colkitt believed 
was then due, reserving for itself the right to contest the 
disputed balance." Br. of Appellee at 13. GFL claims that 
Colkitt neither responded to its overtures nor attempted to 
prepay or pay any amounts to GFL. 
 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On April 4, 1997, GFL filed a complaint against Colkitt 
alleging breach of his obligations on the National Medical 
and EquiMed notes. On June 6, 1997, Colkitt filed an 
answer, affirmative defenses, and six counterclaims. The 
affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged, inter alia, 
that GFL engaged in securities fraud and market 
manipulation in violation of various federal and state 
securities laws by temporarily depressing the prices of 
National Medical and EquiMed stock through its 
concentrated short sales. Colkitt claimed that GFL engaged 
in the scheme so that it could exchange debt for shares at 
an artificially low price and earn enormous windfall profits 
when prices returned to their normal levels. On March 31, 
1998, the district court adopted a magistrate judge's 
recommendations that Colkitt's counterclaims be 
dismissed. The district court dismissed one counterclaim 
with prejudice and the balance without prejudice. 2 On April 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Court dismissed counterclaims I (Section 10(b) of the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 under the Act), III (Section 29 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), IV (Pennsylvania Securities Act), 
and V (common law fraud) without prejudice for lack of specificity. The 
court dismissed counterclaim II (Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933) 
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20, 1998, Colkitt filed amended counterclaims in an effort 
to cure the deficiencies of the original counterclaims, but 
on February 2, 1999, the district court again dismissed 
Colkitt's inadequately pled counterclaims without prejudice 
for lack of specificity. 
 
On April 25, 2000, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of GFL based largely on the reasoning of 
In re Olympia Brewing Co. Securities Litigation , 613 F. 
Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1985). The court concluded that, 
because short selling is not an unlawful trading practice, it 
would not draw the inference that GFL manipulated the 
market price of EquiMed and National Medical stocks 
simply because GFL engaged in substantial short selling of 
the stocks. The court also determined that Colkitt failed to 
present evidence that GFL's short sales had an appreciable 
effect on the prices of the stocks. Finally, the court 
concluded that even if the short sales did depress prices, 
Colkitt failed to show that "the declines in price are 
attributable to false information injected into the market by 
the short sales and not to information otherwise available 
to the market." GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, No. 
4:CV-97-0526, Memorandum and Order at 22 (M.D. Pa. 
Apr. 25, 2000). 
 
On July 17, 2000, the district court denied Colkitt's 
motion for reconsideration and entered final judgment in 
favor of GFL. The court clarified its earlier ruling on GFL's 
motion for summary judgment, explaining that the evidence 
of GFL's short sales alone was insufficient to establish 
Colkitt's claims of securities fraud and market 
manipulation because selling stocks short is lawful. The 
court declared that "[t]here must be some circumstances 
beyond the mere occurrence of short sales to suggest that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
with prejudice, subject to reinstatement in the event that we recognize a 
private right of action under Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. S 77q(a). The court dismissed counterclaim count VI (unjust 
enrichment) without prejudice because the equitable remedy of unjust 
enrichment is not available when a contract exists between the parties. 
Although the court initially dismissed count VI with prejudice, the court 
concluded on reconsideration that the order was in error and changed 
the dismissal to a dismissal without prejudice. 
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the short sales were part of a scheme to manipulate the 
market," which Colkitt failed to proffer. GFL Advantage 
Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, No. 4:CV-97-0526, Memorandum and 
Order at 14 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2000). The court then 
proceeded to reject Colkitt's argument that numerous 
inferences that he believed should be drawn from the 
factual record created genuine issues of material fact that 
precluded summary judgment. The court refused to accept 
any of Colkitt's proffered inferences -- each of which Colkitt 
has raised on appeal -- and reaffirmed its decision that 
GFL was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
 




The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
GFL's breach of contract action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332 based upon diversity of the parties and the amount 
in controversy. The district court entered final judgment in 
this case on July 17, 2000, and appellant filed a timely 
notice of appeal on August 15, 2000. Therefore, we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As noted above, the district court twice dismissed certain of Colkitt's 
counterclaims without prejudice for lack of specificity. In some 
circumstances, such a dismissal could deprive us of appellate 
jurisdiction as "ordinarily we do not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 of an appeal from an order partially adjudicating a case when an 
appellant has asserted a claim in district court which it has withdrawn 
or dismissed without prejudice." Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of 
Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 2000). Our case law, however, allows us 
to exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291 when the 
district court has divested itself of the case entirely. See id. at 202. 
Here, 
although the district court's orders dismissed Colkitt's counterclaims 
without prejudice, the court's summary judgment order effectively barred 
Colkitt from re-filing them, for the court concluded that Colkitt's 
affirmative defenses -- which were identical to his counterclaims -- 
failed as a matter of law. Consequently, the court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of GFL terminated the suit so far as the 
court was concerned. See Trent v. Dial Med. of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 
220 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Even dismissals without prejudice have been held to 
be final and appealable if they `end [ ] [the] suit so far as the District 
Court was concerned . . . .' ") (citation omitted). Therefore, we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
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B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment 
de novo and apply the same standard as the district court 
applied in the first instance. See Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Lucent Tech., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1999). We 
may affirm summary judgment in favor of GFL only if, after 
drawing all reasonable inferences from the record in the 
light most favorable to Colkitt, "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact" and GFL is "entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As the nonmoving 
party, Colkitt must create a genuine issue of material fact 
by presenting sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find in 
his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 
248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). To defeat summary 
judgment, he "cannot rest simply on the allegations in the 
pleadings," but "must rely on affidavits, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file." Bhatla v. 
U.S. Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Therefore, it will be appropriate to affirm summary 
judgment for GFL if we conclude that there is insufficient 





A. RESCISSION OF THE NOTES PURSUANT TO SECTION 
29 
 
Colkitt contends that the National Medical and EquiMed 
notes are unenforceable by reason of Section 29 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") because 
GFL violated the anti-fraud provisions under Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder. Section 29(b) provides in relevant part that: 
 
       Every contract made in violation of any provision of this 
       chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, . .. [or] 
       the performance of which involves the violation of, or 
       the continuance of any relationship or practice in 
       violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or 
       regulation thereunder, shall be void. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78cc(b) (emphasis added). Colkitt argues that 
GFL violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when it engaged 
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in market manipulation by short selling National Medical 
and EquiMed stock in an effort to depress the share prices, 
and when it engaged in fraudulent deception by concealing 
its plan to short sell National Medical and EquiMed stock. 
See Br. of Appellant at 24. Colkitt asserts that the notes are 
void and unenforceable under Section 29(b) because the 
notes were "made in violation of" Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 insofar as (1) they were part of GFL's scheme to 
manipulate the market prices of National Medical and 
EquiMed stock and (2) they contain omissions of material 
fact about GFL's short selling strategy. See Reply Br. of 
Appellant at 19. 
 
GFL argues that Colkitt's Section 29(b) affirmative 
defense fails for two reasons. First, Section 29(b) is a 
remedial provision that is triggered only when another 
section of the Exchange Act has been violated. As 
addressed below, GFL maintains that it did not engage in 
either market manipulation or securities fraud in violation 
of Section 10(b), and therefore, there is no underlying 
offense to trigger Section 29(b). See infra pp. 17-36. Second, 
GFL contends that Colkitt fails to state a proper Section 
29(b) defense inasmuch as Colkitt alleges that it is GFL's 
short selling, not the National Medical and EquiMed notes, 
that is unlawful. GFL argues that only "unlawful contracts," 
not "unlawful transactions" executed pursuant to lawful 
contracts, may be rescinded under Section 29(b). 
 
We deal with GFL's second contention first, which is 
supported by the limited body of case law on the point. For 
instance, in Slomiak v. Bear Stearns & Co., 597 F. Supp. 
676, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), plaintiff opened a margin account 
and a repurchase account with defendant Bear Stearns. He 
purchased millions of dollars of government bonds in his 
margin account -- less than 10% with cash and the 
remainder with loans by Bear Stearns. See id.  When 
plaintiff was notified of a margin call on his account and 
failed to muster the $155,000 in additional margin 
demanded, Bear Stearns liquidated the government bonds 
in plaintiff's account. See id. Plaintiff alleged that Bear 
Stearns violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-16 by failing to 
provide him at the time he opened his accounts with a 
written statement explaining the terms under which Bear 
 
                                11 
 
 
Stearns would extend him credit. See id. Based on these 
alleged violations, plaintiff sought to rescind all of his bond 
transactions pursuant to Section 29(b). See id.  at 681. The 
court concluded that plaintiff could not rescind the 
transactions, explaining: 
 
       The complaint alleges that Bear Stearns failed to send 
       plaintiff a written credit disclosure statement in 
       violation of Rule 10b-16 at the time he opened his 
       accounts; it does not allege that the customer 
       agreements establishing his margin and repurchase 
       accounts at Bear Stearns were themselves unlawful 
       . . . . `[U]nder S 29 of the Exchange Act, only unlawful 
       contracts may be rescinded, not unlawful transactions 
       made pursuant to lawful contracts.' 
 
Id. at 681-82 (quoting Zerman v. Jacobs , 510 F. Supp. 132, 
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(table)). Because Bear Stearns's alleged violation of Rule 
10b-16 was "clearly collateral to the contract agreement 
governing the account," the court determined that the 
firm's failure to provide the written statement to plaintiff 
did "not justify rescission of the account agreement itself or 
the transactions undertaken pursuant to that agreement." 
Id. at 682-83. 
 
In Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. , 433 F. 
Supp. 485, 488-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), plaintiffs maintained 
margin accounts with defendant Thomson McKinnon 
Securities between 1973 and 1975. Plaintiffs began selling 
naked options in 1974 and profited handsomely off the 
transactions until 1975, when the market began spiking 
upward. See id. Between January and May 1975, plaintiffs 
incurred substantial losses on their options until Thomson 
McKinnon finally closed their accounts and liquidated their 
collateral. See id. at 489. Plaintiffs sought to rescind the 
options contracts pursuant to Section 29(b) because 
Thomson McKinnon allegedly violated Regulation T by 
failing to direct plaintiffs to deposit the required amount of 
initial margin in their accounts. See id. The court rejected 
plaintiffs' claim, stating that Section 29(b) "only renders 
void those contracts which by their terms violate the Act or 
the rules and regulations thereunder . . . for it is only such 
contracts which are `made in violation of,' or`the 
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performance of which involves the violation of' the statute 
and the rules and regulations thereunder." Id. at 501-02. 
The court explained that even if Thomson McKinnon had 
violated Regulation T, Section 29(b) was inapplicable 
because the options contracts that plaintiffs sought to 
rescind were governed by a valid, lawful contract whose 
terms did not violate the Exchange Act or any regulations 
promulgated thereunder. See id. at 502. 
 
Colkitt responds to GFL's argument by citing Regional 
Properties, Inc. v. Financial and Real Estate Consulting Co., 
678 F.2d 552, 560 (5th Cir. 1982), which challenges 
Drasner's narrow construction of Section 29(b). In Regional 
Properties, two real estate entrepreneurs brought suit 
against their broker and his firm, Financial and Real Estate 
Consulting Co. ("Financial"), alleging that the broker had 
violated Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act by selling 
limited partnership interests for them without having 
registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer. See id. at 556. 
The entrepreneurs and their affiliated corporations sought 
to rescind their agreements with Financial pursuant to 
Section 29(b) in light of the broker's violations of Section 
15(a)(1). See id. The court rejected Drasner's conclusion 
that Section 29(b) renders void only those contracts that 
"by their terms" violate the Exchange Act and instead 
interpreted Section 29(b) as "render[ing] voidable those 
contracts that are either illegal when made or as in fact 
performed." Id. at 560. The court concluded that rescission 
was proper because, although plaintiffs sought to avoid 
contracts that were "perfectly lawful on their face," the 
performance of the contracts by Financial nevertheless 
"resulted in a violation of the Act." Id.  at 561. The court 
added: "That these contracts, under different 
circumstances, could have been performed without 
violating the Act is immaterial." Id. 
 
Although the court of appeals in Regional Properties 
rescinded the contracts therein and explicitly rejected 
Drasner's narrow reading of Section 29(b), its opinion is 
nevertheless consistent with the outcomes in Drasner, 
Slomiak, and Zerman. In particular, the violations of the 
Exchange Act alleged in Drasner, Slomiak , and Zerman were 
"collateral or tangential to the contract between the 
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parties," whereas the violation alleged in Regional Properties 
was "inseparable from the performance of the contract" that 
plaintiffs were attempting to void. Slomiak, 597 F. Supp. at 
682. The parties could -- and did -- perform the contracts 
at issue in Drasner, Slomiak, and Zerman without 
committing any violations of the Exchange Act, but the 
broker in Regional Properties could not carry out his 
obligations under the agreements without violating the 
Exchange Act, for performance of the agreements entailed 
selling partnership interests, which the broker lawfully 
could not do due to his failure to register as a broker- 
dealer. 
 
The other two cases cited by Colkitt are also consistent 
with this analysis. In both cases, the courts voided loan 
agreements because the banks violated Regulation U, which 
governs the amount of money that a bank can lend for the 
purchase of registered securities. In Grove v. First National 
Bank of Herminie, 489 F.2d 512, 513 (3d Cir. 1974) (per 
curiam), bank employees failed to explain to plaintiff that 
under federal law, the bank "could lend only a certain 
percentage of the market value of stock to purchase 
registered securities." Concluding that the bank had 
violated Regulation U, we held that Section 29(b) precluded 
the bank from recovering a deficiency, "even if the borrower 
knowingly and intentionally deceives the bank as to the 
actual purposes of the loans." Id. at 516. 
 
In Stonehill v. Security National Bank, 68 F.R.D. 24, 28 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), a bank sought to recover the outstanding 
balance on a loan, but the borrower claimed that the loan 
was void and unenforceable because the bank issued the 
loan in violation of Regulation U. The bank argued that 
even if the borrower's obligations were void due to the 
bank's alleged violation of Regulation U, it still could 
recover from the guarantor. See id. at 33. The court 
disagreed, holding that "if the principal obligation violates 
Regulation U, a guarantee of that obligation is void under 
S 29(b) of the Exchange Act." Id. The court explained that 
"allow[ing] a bank to recover on a guarantee even though 
the underlying loan violated Regulation U would encourage 
banks to extend credit in violation of the margin 
requirements." Id. at 34. 
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As with the violation of Section 15(a)(1) in Regional 
Properties, the violations of Regulation U in Grove and 
Stonehill were inseparable from the underlying agreements 
between the parties: the banks could not perform their 
obligations under the loan agreements (i.e., lend money to 
the borrowers so that they could purchase securities) 
without violating Regulation U. In fact, the loans were 
"made in violation of" the Exchange Act because a greater 
percentage of the loans was used to purchase securities 
than is allowed under Regulation U. 
 
The same cannot be said for GFL's obligations under the 
National Medical and EquiMed notes in this case. GFL's 
allegedly unlawful short sales of National Medical and 
EquiMed stock were nothing more than "collateral or 
tangential" to the notes. Colkitt insists that performance of 
the contracts "involves a violation of" securities laws 
because "performance itself (exchange of shares and 
repayment of the loan plus interest) . . . supports GFL's 
illegal short selling by giving GFL shares with which to 
cover the short sales." Br. of Appellant at 25 n.8. Despite 
the theory of Colkitt's case, however, GFL's short sales are 
completely independent of the parties' respective obligations 
under the terms of the notes -- namely, GFL's obligation to 
lend Colkitt a total of $13,000,000, and Colkitt's obligation 
to repay the loans at GFL's option with shares of National 
Medical and EquiMed stock. In the end, GFL's alleged 
unlawful activity (i.e., its short sales) is too attenuated from 
the parties' valid, lawful contracts (i.e., the National Medical 
and EquiMed notes) or GFL's performance thereunder. 
Therefore, we conclude that the notes were neither made 
nor performed in violation of any federal securities laws as 
is required for rescission under Section 29(b). 4 
 
B. MARKET MANIPULATION 
 
Colkitt argues that the district court erred in rejecting his 
affirmative defense that the notes are void pursuant to 
Section 29(b) due to GFL's alleged market manipulation, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Notwithstanding our conclusions as to the scope of Section 29(b), we 
will discuss the market manipulation and securities fraud issues as our 
conclusions on them are critical to our disposition of Colkitt's appeal 
from the dismissal of his counterclaims. See supra note 3. 
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there exist genuine issues of material fact regarding 
whether GFL's short sales constituted market manipulation 
in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. GFL argues, 
however, that Colkitt has not presented enough evidence to 




5. GFL also insists that Colkitt cannot obtain reversal of summary 
judgment with respect to GFL's alleged manipulation of National 
Medical's price because Colkitt abandoned his market manipulation and 
securities fraud claims with respect to National Medical by conceding 
that GFL's short sales of National Medical stock did not violate any 
securities laws. See Br. of Appellee at 19-21. To support its contention, 
GFL quotes a passage from Colkitt's opposition to GFL's motion for 
summary judgment, which states that "[t]he short selling of National 
Medical presents an interesting contrast to the short selling of EquiMed." 
Id. at 20 (quoting Colkitt's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 
6 (App. 000837)). GFL claims that this statement, along with other 
unspecified passages in Colkitt's opposition and his motion for 
reconsideration, led the district court to limit its rulings to only the 
EquiMed note. 
 
GFL's argument is without merit. A review of the district court's April 
25, 2000 Memorandum reveals that the court addressed Colkitt's market 
manipulation and securities fraud claims as to both EquiMed and 
National Medical. Indeed, National Medical is mentioned throughout the 
district court's summary judgment and reconsideration rulings. There is 
no indication in the district court's rulings that Colkitt abandoned these 
claims or that the court limited its rulings to only the EquiMed note. 
 
GFL also distorts the meaning of the above-quoted passage by taking 
it out of context. When Colkitt admitted that the short sales of National 
Medical differed in some respects to the short sales of EquiMed, he was 
referring only to GFL's contention that it engaged in the short sales as 
a hedging strategy. As will be explained in more detail below, see infra 
pp. 28-30, Colkitt's expert maintains that selling short prior to the 
five- 
day period before the exchange demand is not a legitimate hedging 
strategy, but instead an attempt to profit from declining stock prices. 
The expert insists that if GFL were only trying to hedge against a 
possible drop in price after the exchange demand (so-called "delivery 
risk"), GFL could have eliminated that risk by selling short during the 
five-day period before the exchange demand -- in essence, locking in the 
sale price during the same period the average closing price would be 
calculated. Colkitt's statement was simply an "acknowledgment that, 
unlike the EquiMed shorts, the National Medical shorts, by their timing, 
could at least qualify as a hedge strategy" because they were made 
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1. Elements of Market Manipulation Under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 
 
As an initial matter, the parties disagree about the specific 
elements of market manipulation under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5. To complicate matters further, we seemed not 
to have addressed squarely what elements are required to 
establish a claim of market manipulation, particularly in 
the context of a Section 29(b) affirmative defense, and the 
case law from other courts of appeals and district courts on 
this issue provides limited guidance. Section 10(b) states in 
relevant part that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person 
. . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security . . ., any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations" promulgated by the SEC. 15 U.S.C.S 78j. Rule 
10b-5 provides in relevant part that "[i]t shall be unlawful 
for any person . . . [t]o employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud." 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. 
 
Noting that Section 10(b) outlaws but does not define a 
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," Colkitt 
turns to Section 9(a) of the Exchange Act to determine the 
elements of the offense of market manipulation. Section 
9(a) prohibits individuals from effecting "a series of 
transactions in any security registered on a national 
securities exchange . . . creating actual or apparent active 
trading in such security, or raising or depressing the price 
of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase 
or sale of such security by others." 15 U.S.C.S 78i(a)(2). 
Based on this passage and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695, 100 S.Ct. 1945, 1955 
(1980), in which the Court recognized scienter as an 
element of a Section 10(b) claim, Colkitt maintains that 
summary judgment was improper because he created 
genuine issues with respect to each of the following 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
within the days immediately preceding GFL's exchange demands for 
National Medical stock. Reply Br. of Appellant at 5. This narrow 
admission cannot be construed as a complete waiver of his 
counterclaims and affirmative defenses with respect to the National 
Medical note. 
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elements of market manipulation: (1) GFL engaged in a 
series of transactions in the registered securities; (2) the 
purpose of GFL's short sales was to induce others to sell 
the securities; (3) GFL's short sales created "actual or 
apparent active trading" in the securities or depressed the 
prices of the securities; and (4) GFL acted with scienter. 
 
GFL responds that Colkitt has mischaracterized the 
elements of market manipulation by applying an overly 
broad description of prohibited activities set forth under 
Section 9(a) and by ignoring the specific requirements of 
market manipulation that have evolved over time. GFL 
points out that market manipulation is "virtually a term of 
art when used in connection with the securities market. It 
connotes intentional and willful conduct designed to 
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially 
affecting the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1384 (1976). 
GFL asserts that Colkitt disregards two necessary elements 
of a market manipulation claim -- that "GFL injected 
inaccurate information into the marketplace" and that 
GFL's conduct "affected the price" of National Medical and 
EquiMed stock. Br. of Appellee at 24. 
 
The first disputed element is whether Colkitt must 
demonstrate that GFL injected inaccurate information into 
the marketplace or created a false impression of market 
activity. Like the district court, GFL relies on Olympia 
Brewing, 613 F. Supp. at 1292, in which the district court 
emphasized that the "essential element" of a market 
manipulation claim is the injection of "inaccurate 
information" into the market. GFL observes that even the 
cases cited by Colkitt "recognize that market manipulation 
requires an additional element, something beyond 
otherwise legal trading, which specifically injects false 
information into the market and/or creates an artificial 
demand for the underlying security." Br. of Appellee at 22 
(emphasis added). Colkitt responds, however, that he is not 
required to present evidence that "GFL injected affirmative 
misinformation into the market," but only needs to 
demonstrate that "GFL's short trades were made for the 
undisclosed purpose of artificially depressing share prices." 
Reply Br. of Appellant at 9 (emphasis added). 
 
                                18 
 
 
Notwithstanding Colkitt's assertion to the contrary, the 
parties appear to be in accord on this point. Indeed, the 
difference between their positions seems to be one without 
distinction. Both GFL and Colkitt focus on the need to 
demonstrate that some action was taken to artificially 
depress or inflate prices, whether by purposely making 
false statements or by employing illegitimate, deceptive 
trading techniques that mislead investors about the price or 
demand for a stock. 
 
To the extent that the parties' respective positions are at 
odds, however, GFL advances a sounder construction of a 
Section 10(b) market manipulation claim, for it is less 
vague than Colkitt's. The Supreme Court has indicated that 
market manipulation "generally refers to practices, such as 
wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are 
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market 
activity." Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476, 97 
S.Ct. 1292, 1302 (1977). "The gravamen of manipulation is 
deception of investors into believing that prices at which 
they purchase and sell securities are determined by the 
natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by 
manipulators." Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d 
Cir. 1999). In that vein, courts must distinguish between 
legitimate trading strategies intended to anticipate and 
respond to prevailing market forces and those designed to 
manipulate prices and deceive purchasers and sellers. 
Although Colkitt's construction properly reflects the 
aspiration of Section 10(b) of preventing market activities 
that artificially depress prices, it provides little guidance on 
which activities artificially affect prices and which activities 
legitimately impact prices. 
 
Requiring a Section 10(b) plaintiff to establish that the 
alleged manipulator injected "inaccurate information" into 
the market or created a false impression of market activity 
cures this problem. Such a construction permits courts to 
differentiate between legitimate trading activities that 
permissibly may influence prices, such as short sales, and 
"ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate 
securities prices," Santa Fe Indus., 462 U.S. at 477, 97 S. 
Ct. at 1303, such as wash sales and matched orders. As 
the court in Olympia Brewing, 613 F. Supp. at 1292, 
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stated, "[r]egardless of whether market manipulation is 
achieved through deceptive trading activities or deceptive 
statements as to the issuing corporation's value, it is clear 
that the essential element of the claim is that inaccurate 
information is being injected into the marketplace." 
 
The second disputed element is whether Colkitt must 
establish that GFL's allegedly manipulative conduct 
actually depressed the prices of National Medical and 
EquiMed stock. GFL argues that market manipulation in 
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires that the 
allegedly unlawful conduct impact a security's price. GFL 
cites three cases to support its position, but all three are 
unhelpful. First, although we stated in Rosenberg v. Hano, 
121 F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1941) (footnote omitted), that 
"the party claiming injury must plead and prove some 
change in price, because of the prohibited acts," the case 
involved an alleged violation of Section 9, not Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5. Second, the opinion in United States v. 
Russo, 74 F.3d 1383, 1394 (2d Cir. 1996), is not significant 
here because it only addressed the propriety of the portion 
of the district court's jury instruction on the scienter 
element that defined artificial price as the price level above 
the stock's actual value as determined by market forces. 
Third, the decision in In re Blech Securities Litigation, 928 
F. Supp. 1279, 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted), 
directly contradicts GFL's position by stating that"[t]he 
absence of allegations of market dominance and price 
movement are not fatal to" a claim of market manipulation, 
for although "these may be classic attributes of market 
manipulation, they are not requisites." 
 
Colkitt's position is somewhat inconsistent on this point. 
On the one hand, he takes great pains to argue that GFL's 
short sales depressed the price of National Medical by 
17.5% and the price of EquiMed by 18.5%. On the other 
hand, when confronted with evidence that the prices of the 
stocks were on a sharp downward trend before and after 
GFL's short sales, thus raising serious doubts about the 
true reason for the declining prices, Colkitt reverses course 
and argues that he need not prove that GFL's alleged 
scheme was successful in depressing prices. Colkitt insists 
that he only must establish that GFL attempted to depress 
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prices by selling shares short. To muddy the waters even 
more, Colkitt appears to make a concession that an impact 
on price must be established when he states in his reply 
brief: "A jury must also decide whether GFL's short trades 
had an affect [sic] on share prices." Reply Br. of Appellant 
at 11. 
 
Despite his flip-flopping on the issue, Colkitt appears to 
be correct that he need not prove that GFL's manipulative 
conduct actually depressed prices. The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit concluded in Chemetron Corp. v. Business 
Funds, Inc., 718 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 1983), that Section 
10(b), unlike Section 9(a), does not require that a plaintiff 
prove the allegedly unlawful activities had an effect on the 
price of the stock. Although any damages that Colkitt 
would be entitled to recover under his Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 counterclaim would be contingent on proving 
that GFL's conduct actually depressed prices, proof of price 
movement is not necessary to establish a violation of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and therefore is not necessary 




6. Although maintaining a private right of action under Section 10(b) 
requires a plaintiff to prove reliance and damages (usually reflected in 
the stock's price movement), Section 29(b) only requires a violation of 
Section 10(b), not the maintenance of a private suit under Section 10(b). 
Therefore, looking to the statutory language of the anti-fraud provision, 
we note that an individual violates Section 10(b)-- and therefore triggers 
Section 29(b) -- when he or she employs manipulative or deceptive 
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. This 
situation is analogous to a government prosecution under Section 10(b), 
in which the government is not required to meet the normal standing 
requirements imposed on those asserting a private remedy, inasmuch as 
the government need not demonstrate that the defendant's conduct 
induced reliance by investors or affected the price of the security. See, 
e.g., United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation). 
 
Even if we were to embrace the position of GFL and the district court 
that proof of an effect on price is necessary to establish a claim of 
market manipulation, the district court still erred in concluding that 
Colkitt failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to 
price movement. As already noted, Colkitt claims that the price of 
 
                                21 
 
 
We are satisfied that, at bottom, neither party properly 
articulates the elements of market manipulation under 
Section 10(b) in the context of a Section 29(b) affirmative 
defense. Because we have not squarely addressed this 
issue, we must set forth the necessary elements for such a 
claim. In this regard, we conclude that to establish a 
Section 29(b) affirmative defense of market manipulation in 
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Colkitt must 
present evidence that (1) in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities, (2) GFL engaged in deceptive or 
manipulative conduct by injecting inaccurate information 
into the marketplace or creating a false impression of 
supply and demand for the security (3) for the purpose of 
artificially depressing or inflating the price of the security. 
 
2. Evidence Supporting Colkitt's Claim of Market 
Manipulation 
 
Colkitt's affirmative defense based upon GFL's alleged 
market manipulation fails because he cannot demonstrate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
National Medical dropped 17.5% and the price of EquiMed plummeted 
18.5% during the period of GFL's short sales. The district court 
concluded, however, that these statistics are "not evidence that the value 
of the shares was affected by the short sales: the free fall began before 
the short sales and continued well after the short sales." GFL Advantage 
Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, No. 4:CV-97-0526, Memorandum and Order at 21 
(M.D. Pa. July 17, 2000). The district court observed that the price of 
EquiMed declined steadily from $15.00 on February 1, 1996, to $2.4583 
on January 2, 1998, including a dramatic drop of 27.6%, from $7.25 to 
$5.25, during the 24-day period immediately preceding GFL's short 
sales. See id. at 20-21. The court also noted that National Medical 
plummeted from $12.875 on May 1, 1996, to $0.4375 on January 2, 
1998. See GFL Advantage, Ltd. v. Colkitt, No. 4:CV-97-0526, 
Memorandum and Order at 18 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2000). Based on these 
long-term, downward trends in the stocks' prices, the district court 
concluded that Colkitt could not prove that GFL's short sales had an 
effect on the price of either National Medical or EquiMed stock. Although 
the court was correct that other factors clearly were contributing to the 
slide in prices, it was not within the court's province to weigh the 
evidence as a finder of fact. Whether and how much GFL's alleged 
unlawful conduct contributed to the downturn in prices would have been 
issues for the jury if Colkitt's case had survived GFL's motion for 
summary judgment. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Colkitt 
clearly created genuine issues as to whether GFL's short sales affected 
the prices of National Medical and EquiMed. 
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that GFL engaged in any deceptive or manipulative conduct 
by injecting false inaccurate information into the 
marketplace or creating a false impression of supply and 
demand for the stock. As the district court explained 
repeatedly in its two rulings, Colkitt has not presented any 
evidence that GFL did anything but lawfully engage in short 
sales of National Medical and EquiMed stock. The fact that 
these short sales may have contributed to a decline in the 
stocks' prices is not evidence of deceptive or manipulative 
conduct, for there is no reason to believe these prices were 
depressed artificially. See Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered 
Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that 
defendant's "unprecedented massive short selling" did not 
create "a false impression of supply and demand" because 
on the other side of defendant's transactions were"real 
buyers, betting against [defendant], however foolishly, that 
the price of [the] stock would rise"); Olympia Brewing, 613 
F. Supp. at 1296 (stating that "short selling is simply not 
unlawful, even in large numbers and even if the trading 
does negatively affect the purchase price"). Indeed, the 
district court stated it well when it wrote that it is 
unreasonable "to infer unlawful intent from lawful activity 
alone." GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt , No. 4:CV-97- 
0526, Memorandum and Order at 19 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 
2000). 
 
In the cases Colkitt cites in which courts concluded that 
a party's short selling was part of a scheme to manipulate 
stock prices, the short selling was in conjunction with some 
other deceptive practice that either injected inaccurate 
information into the market or otherwise artificially affected 
the price of the stock. See Russo, 74 F.3d at 1387, 1390, 
1391 (defendants used short sales in concert with 
"unauthorized placements" and "parking" of stock in 
customers' accounts to generate false credits that funded 
their "stock-kiting scheme" designed to artificially inflate 
stock prices); United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 829 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (defendants sought to depress temporarily the 
price of stock by arranging to have 40,000 shares sold 
short secretly to a broker-dealer without disclosing to the 
dealer the identity of the seller or the moving party behind 
the deal); United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 344 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (to facilitate a take-over bid, defendants 
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artificially depressed stock prices by getting others to sell 
86,100 shares short and "guaranteeing these sellers by 
secret understanding a recovery of $22 per share 
irrespective of the price obtained on the Exchange"); 
Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc. , No. 92 
Civ. 6879 (CSH), 1996 WL 14440 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1996) 
(defendant attempted to depress stock prices through short 
sales that contravened Section 10(a) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule 10a-1 thereunder, which prohibits a short sale 
"below the price at which the last sale" of the security was 
reported), vacated in part on other grounds, 106 F.3d 11 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
The remaining cases of market manipulation Colkitt cites 
likewise involved either injection of inaccurate information 
into the market or creation of a false impression of supply 
and demand for a stock. See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 
467, 97 S.Ct. at 1298 (defendant obtained "fraudulent 
appraisal" of stock that severely undervalued its worth "in 
order to lull the minority stockholders into erroneously 
believing that [its cash-exchange offer] was generous"); 
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 
792-93 (2d Cir. 1969) (in an effort to inflate prices and 
thwart a corporate take-over, defendant "painted the tape" 
by purchasing large blocks of stock in the open market at 
inflated prices while simultaneously making large secret 
and unreported sales at lower prices to partially finance the 
purchases); Blech, 928 F. Supp. at 1286, 1298 (defendant 
arranged "sham transactions" to inflate prices by 
improperly directing trades into and out of brokerage 
accounts at the firm without the authorization of the 
owners of the accounts); SEC v. Kimmes, 799 F. Supp. 852, 
856-57 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (defendant maintained artificially 
high stock prices by buying and selling stock through 
"undisclosed nominee accounts," distributing"false and 
misleading registration statements," and filing"false and 
materially misleading period reports" with the SEC), aff'd 
sub nom., SEC v. Quinn, 997 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1993); SEC 
v. Malenfant, 784 F. Supp. 141, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(defendant arranged "matched buy and sell orders" to 
"create a misleading appearance of active trading in the 
Texscan common stock" and thus drive up the price of the 
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stock). Once again, Colkitt fails to proffer any evidence that 
GFL engaged in any such inappropriate conduct. 
 
Colkitt attempts to overcome this dearth of evidence of 
deceptive or manipulative conduct on the part of GFL by 
claiming that short sales, by their very nature,"convey to 
market participants negative information about the 
prospects of the firm." Br. of Appellant at 39. Colkitt's 
argument misses the mark, however, because conveying 
negative information about a firm does not constitute 
market manipulation unless the information is untruthful. 
Indeed, legitimate short sales often convey negative 
information about a company insofar as short sales suggest 
that a stock's price is overvalued, but that does not mean 
that such sales distort the market. To the contrary, short 
selling can help move an overvalued stock's market price 
toward its true value, thus creating a more efficient 
marketplace in which stock prices reflect all available 
relevant information about the stock's economic value. See 
Sullivan & Long, 47 F.3d at 861-62. 
 
Colkitt maintains that National Medical and EquiMed 
were not overvalued. He insists that, because GFL did not 
argue before the district court that it sold short because it 
believed the stocks were overvalued, Colkitt is entitled to 
the inference that "the short sales were made at least in 
part to convey to the market the false impression that the 
stocks were overvalued so as to result in a decline in share 
prices." Br. of Appellant at 40 (emphasis in original). It 
would not be reasonable to draw such an inference, 
however, for to do so would fly in the face of uncontradicted 
evidence that the prices of National Medical and EquiMed 
were on a dramatic slide before and after GFL's short sales. 
If we were to draw any inference from the record evidence 
about the value of National Medical and EquiMed, it would 
be that the market considered the stocks to be overvalued 
and that GFL simply was responding to market forces, 
rather than distorting them, by engaging in short sales. 
 
An examination of Colkitt's other requested inferences,7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The parties disagree about the standard of review that should be 
applied to Colkitt's requested inferences. GFL contends that the standard 
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see Br. of Appellant at 30-35, exposes Colkitt's claims for 
what they are -- nothing more than a general attack on the 
lawful practice of short selling. For instance, Colkitt's first 
two inferences -- that GFL had a "unique financial 
incentive" to depress the prices of National Medical and 
EquiMed because its profits increased as the market prices 
decreased,8 and that short selling "conveys negative 
information" about the company being short sold and 
contributes to a drop in share prices -- are general 
criticisms of short selling. These inferences, even if granted, 
are of no help to Colkitt in trying to prove market 
manipulation, inasmuch as short selling is a lawful 
investment strategy. Colkitt's next three requested 
inferences -- that GFL's short sales constituted a large 
percentage of shares sold on a daily basis, that GFL's short 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
is abuse of discretion because Colkitt raised these inferences for the 
first 
time when it filed its motion for reconsideration. Colkitt maintains that 
the standard is plenary because he raised all of the evidence and 
advanced all of the arguments at earlier stages in the litigation. This 
point is moot, however, because we would uphold the district court's 
rulings with respect to the inferences under either standard. 
 
8. Colkitt believes that GFL's incentive to depress prices is "unique" 
because the structure of the convertible notes allows GFL to receive more 
shares -- and thus higher profits -- as the stocks' prices decline. This 
incentive, however, is not unique to GFL's situation. All short sellers 
receive higher profits as the stock's price declines. Indeed, these higher 
profits in the face of declining prices are why traders engage in short 
sales. They are betting that the stock's price will decline, and if it 
does 
so, they will have to spend less money buying replacement stock to cover 
the borrowed shares, thus allowing them to pocket the difference. 
 
Colkitt's differentiation between GFL and other short sellers based on 
the structure of the National Medical and EquiMed notes is misguided. 
Whether GFL acquires $100,000 worth of shares from Colkitt in 
exchange for debt (as GFL did here) or in exchange for cash (as short 
sellers normally do when they cover) is irrelevant. In either situation, 
GFL will be able to obtain more shares from Colkitt if prices decline. 
Thus, if this "unique" incentive to depress prices is evidence that GFL 
engaged in market manipulation, then all short traders are likewise 
guilty of manipulating markets in violation of Section 10(b). Of course, 
this position is untenable, for as already explained, short selling is 
perfectly lawful. 
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sales caused a 17.5% decline in National Medical and an 
18.5% decline in EquiMed,9 and that these price slumps 
allowed GFL to obtain an additional 11,658 shares of 
National Medical and an additional 27,882 shares of 
EquiMed from Colkitt -- are equally unavailing. Once again, 
short selling, even in large volumes, is not in and of itself 
unlawful and therefore cannot be regarded as evidence of 
market manipulation. That short selling may depress share 
prices, which in turn may enable traders to acquire more 
shares for less cash (or in this case, for less debt), is not 
evidence of unlawful market manipulation, for they simply 
are natural consequences of a lawful and carefully 
regulated trading practice.10 
 
Colkitt's remaining inferences are equally groundless. 
Because a court is required to indulge only reasonable 
inferences, we reject Colkitt's last three requested 
inferences. For instance, Colkitt insists that GFL's use of 
four different brokers to execute the short trades is 
evidence that GFL tried to conceal its short sales from 
market participants, including Colkitt. This inference is 
unreasonable as GFL needed to use four brokers because 
none of them had enough shares necessary for GFL to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As already noted, see supra note 1, Colkitt greatly exaggerates 
EquiMed's price decline. The price of EquiMed on the day of the GFL's 
first short sale on November 8, 1996, was $5.25 per share, and its price 
on the day of GFL's last short sale on November 22, 1996, was $5.13. 
Consequently, the price of EquiMed dipped only $.12, or 2.3%. 
 
10. A passage in Colkitt's reply brief further undermines his theory that 
short sales are manipulative because they depress prices. He writes: "It 
is reasonable and makes economic sense to infer that short selling drives 
down share prices, because each short sale is, itself, a `sale,' 
increasing 
supply . . . ." Reply Br. of Appellant at 15 (emphasis added). In other 
words, Colkitt believes that short sales are manipulative because they 
increase the stock's supply and drive down its price. This, of course, is 
true (assuming demand remains constant), but it is also true for all 
stock sales, whether they are from long positions or short positions. The 
rationale of Colkitt's theory would lead to the absurd result of outlawing 
any sales practice that increases a security's supply and consequently 
may affect its price. Colkitt fails to understand that increasing the 
supply of stocks by selling them on the open market in legitimate 
transactions to real buyers does not artificially affect prices and 
therefore 
cannot be manipulative. 
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borrow to carry out all of its short sales, which is not 
unusual when dealing with small cap stocks. See  Br. of 
Appellee at 39 (citing Cason Aff. P 13 (App. 001080)). 
 
Colkitt's next requested inference relates to GFL's 
assertion that it sold National Medical and EquiMed short 
to hedge against the stocks' declining prices and to lock in 
the notes' 17.5% and 18.5% profit spreads. Colkitt offers 
expert testimony that GFL's short sales could not have been 
part of a legitimate hedging strategy because too much time 
elapsed between the short sales and the exchange 
demands. The expert avers that if GFL were only trying to 
protect itself against declining prices after it made its 
exchange demand, it could have eliminated that "delivery 
risk" by selling short during the five-day period before the 
exchange demand, thus locking in the sale price during the 
same period the average closing price would be determined. 
Because GFL waited so long after the short sales to make 
its exchange demands, the expert contends GFL was not 
simply hedging against slumping prices, but was 
"increas[ing] the likelihood of increasing profits through 
artificially (and temporarily) lowering the price of EquiMed."11 
Br. of Appellant at 16-17 (quoting Expert Report of 
Professor Steven R. Grenadier P 20. (App. 000860-000861)). 
 
Accepting as true Grenadier's position that GFL could 
have hedged against all risk by selling short during the five- 
days prior to the exchange demands, a court reasonably 
could infer that GFL not only sought to protect itself, but 
also endeavored to reap further profit from the stocks' 
declining prices by selling short. To infer that these 
"premature" short sales were executed to manipulate 
prices, however, would be an unreasonable leap. Indeed, 
Grenadier admits in his deposition that he does not have 
an opinion about whether GFL's short sales artificially 
depressed the prices of EquiMed stock. See Grenadier Dep. 
at 37 (App. 001016). Therefore, although it may be 
reasonable to infer from Grenadier's report that GFL's short 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Grenadier mentions only EquiMed because GFL sold National 
Medical short during the five-day period prior to its exchange demands 
to the stock. Therefore, even under Grenadier's theory, GFL's short 
trades of National Medical qualify as a legitimate hedging strategy. 
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sales were intended not only to hedge against declining 
prices but to profit from them, it would be unreasonable to 
infer that GFL's short sales were deceptive or manipulative, 
especially considering that the expert concedes that he does 
know whether the trades had the effect of manipulating the 
prices.12 
 
Finally, in the words of the district court, Colkitt's last 
requested inference amounts to "baseless and desperate 
mudslinging." Colkitt asserts that GFL was sued twice "for 
engaging in manipulative short selling" thus evidencing that 
it engaged in that type of conduct with regard National 
Medical and EquiMed stock. Br. of Appellant at 35. GFL 
responds that it was not even involved in Global Intellicom, 
Inc. v. Thomson Kernaghan & Co., No. 99-CIV-342, 1999 
WL 544708 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1999). Instead, the case 
involved a former employee whose allegedly unlawful 
conduct occurred after he left GFL. GFL also asserts that 
the action in JTS Corp. v. GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. was 
dismissed in the early stages of the litigation after it filed 
for Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff. Based on GFL's 
averments, it would be entirely inappropriate to grant 
Colkitt's requested inference that these two lawsuits are 
evidence of GFL's alleged market manipulation in this case. 
 
At bottom, the core of Colkitt's argument is premised on 
his belief that short selling artificially depresses prices and 
presumably should be banned as a market manipulation. 
Unfortunately for Colkitt, however, short selling is lawful, 
and courts have held that short selling, even in massive 
volume, is neither deceptive nor manipulative when carried 
out in accordance with SEC rules and regulations. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Other portions of Grenadier's report also appear to undermine such 
a conclusion. In particular, Grenadier endorses the conclusions of 
Harvard Business School's Paul Asquith and Lisa Meulbroek that short 
trading would have an impact on the value of the securities if the 
number of shares sold short constituted 2.5% or more of the total 
outstanding shares. See Grenadier Dep. at 80-81 (App. 001017-001018). 
In this case, GFL sold short a total of 78,700 shares of EquiMed, which 
constituted only .275% of EquiMed's 28,589,717 outstanding shares. 
Therefore, under the standard embraced by Colkitt's own expert, GFL's 
short sales of EquiMed stock would not be expected to have a noticeable 
impact on the stock's price. 
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Sullivan & Long, 47 F.3d at 864-65. Therefore, to make out 
a claim of market manipulation, Colkitt must present 
evidence that GFL engaged in some other type of deceptive 
behavior in conjunction with its short selling that either 
injected inaccurate information into the marketplace or 
created artificial demand for the securities. Colkitt has 
offered nothing but evidence that GFL engaged in lawful 
short sales of National Medical and EquiMed, which alone 
is insufficient to prevail on a claim of market manipulation 
in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
 
Another reason why Colkitt's market manipulation claim 
fails is because he has not met the scienter requirement by 
offering evidence that GFL engaged in short sales for the 
purpose of artificially depressing the prices of National 
Medical and EquiMed stock. Citing our opinion in In re 
Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d 
Cir. 1999), Colkitt argues that he has met the recklessness 
standard for liability under Section 10(b). He contends that 
GFL's conduct constitutes "an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care" and "presents a danger of 
misleading buyers and sellers that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been 
aware of it." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
According to Colkitt, evidence of GFL's alleged recklessness 
includes: GFL's "powerful economic incentive" to depress 
the stocks' prices; "voluminous scholarly evidence" that 
GFL's short sales would convey a "negative impression" of 
the companies; the dramatic drop in the stocks' prices 
during the period of GFL's short selling; the additional 
39,540 shares that GFL "extracted" from Colkitt because of 
the declining prices; GFL's use of four brokers to conceal 
his short sales; the conclusion of Colkitt's expert that GFL's 
short sales were not part of a legitimate hedging strategy; 
and GFL's having been sued twice for similar conduct. 
 
In essence, Colkitt recycles his arguments that he 
advanced in support of his contention that GFL's short 
trades were manipulative and deceptive. Some of this 
evidence and the requested inferences to be taken 
therefrom already have been discredited -- GFL's use of 
multiple brokers, whether GFL's short sales were a 
legitimate hedge strategy, and the alleged lawsuits against 
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GFL for engaging in short selling -- and the rest of the 
evidence and inferences are, once again, general attacks on 
the practice of selling short -- the powerful incentive to 
depress prices, the negative impression of the company 
conveyed by short sales, the actual drop in National 
Medical and EquiMed prices, and the additional shares GFL 
obtained because of the declining prices. All that this 
information proves is that GFL engaged in the lawful 
practice of selling stock short and that these short sales 
may or may not have affected the price of National Medical 
and EquiMed stock. This evidence neither establishes that 
GFL's short sales were manipulative nor demonstrates that 
GFL executed the trades for the purpose of depressing the 
stocks' prices. Perhaps, if Colkitt had offered evidence that 
GFL's short sales violated SEC rules (for instance, if GFL 
failed to cover properly the short sales in violation of Rule 
10a-2, or if GFL made short sales below the last sales price 
in violation of Rule 10a-1), Colkitt might have been able to 
establish that GFL's conduct was intentionally or recklessly 
manipulative or deceptive. In the absence of evidence that 
GFL engaged in any wrongful conduct, however, Colkitt's 
claim of market manipulation must fail. Therefore, we will 
affirm summary judgment in favor of GFL with respect to 
the market manipulation claim. 
 
C. SECURITIES FRAUD 
 
Colkitt also claims that the notes should be voided 
pursuant to Section 29(b) on the grounds that GFL 
committed securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 when it failed to disclose its intent to 
manipulate the prices of National Medical and EquiMed 
stock through short sales. GFL responds that it had no 
duty to disclose its intent to engage in short sales and that 
Colkitt has not established that he either relied on this 
alleged omission of fact or suffered a cognizable injury as a 
result of the reliance. 
 
1. Elements of Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 
 
It is well settled that a claim of securities fraud under 
Section 10(b) requires proof "that the defendant (1) made 
misstatements or omissions of material fact; (2) with 
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scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities; (4) upon which plaintiffs relied; and (5) that 
plaintiffs' reliance was the proximate cause of their injury." 
Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 
1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The parties 
apparently agree that the third element has been 
established, as there is no dispute that the alleged fraud 
was related to the purchase or sale of National Medical and 
EquiMed securities. Therefore, Colkitt must establish 
genuine issues with respect to the following elements: 
omissions of material fact, reliance, cognizable injury, and 
scienter.13 
 
2. Evidence Supporting Colkitt's Claim of Securities 
Fraud 
 
Colkitt asserts that GFL concealed from him two critical 
pieces of information that constitute omissions of material 
fact: (1) GFL's intention to sell short National Medical and 
EquiMed stock; and (2) GFL's actual short sales of the 
stock. Colkitt maintains that GFL had an affirmative duty 
to disclose this information because it was material and he 
would not have entered into the contracts with GFL if he 
had known it planned to sell the stocks short. 
 
Analysis of a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 includes two steps: "First, was the 
defendant under a duty to disclose at the time at issue? 
Second, was the alleged omission or misstatement 
material? If, under the facts of this case, no duty to disclose 
exists, or if the undisclosed facts are not material, there is 
no liability under Rule 10b-5." Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 
F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982). A duty to disclose arises 
only when one party to a transaction has material 
information that the other party is entitled to have because 
of some relationship of trust and confidence between the 
parties, such as when one party is a fiduciary, corporate 
insider, or "tippee." See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 229, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 1115 (1980). The Supreme Court 
has determined that "[a]n omission of fact is material if 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Colkitt submits the same evidence of scienter in support of both his 
securities fraud claim and his market manipulation claim. See supra pp. 
30-31. 
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there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding" 
whether to invest. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
231, 108 S.Ct. 978, 983 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 2132 
(1976)). Materiality is a mixed question of law and fact and 
should be decided as a matter of law "[o]nly when the 
disclosures or omissions are so clearly unimportant that 
reasonable minds could not differ." In re Craftmatic Sec. 
Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 641 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
Colkitt's securities fraud claim falters for at least one and 
possibly two reasons. To start with, he failed to present any 
evidence that GFL intended to engage in short sales at the 
time it loaned the money to Colkitt. See In re Phillips 
Petroleum Secs. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(stating that "a statement of intent need only be true when 
made; a subsequent change of intention will not, by itself, 
give rise to a cause of action under Section 10(b) or Rule 
10b-5"). More significantly, even if we can draw an 
inference that GFL had such a plan, it did not have a duty 
to disclose its intentions. 
 
Colkitt argues that GFL had a duty to disclose its 
intentions because such a disclosure was necessary to 
clarify GFL's "implicit" representations that the debt-for- 
stock exchange price would be "based upon the accurate, 
unbiased and untainted market price quoted by the stock 
market." Br. of Appellant at 48. Colkitt explains that 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 impose a "duty to disclose 
any material facts that are necessary to make disclosed 
material statements, whether mandatory or volunteered, 
not misleading." Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 641. He asserts 
that GFL's implicit guarantee that the exchange price would 
be based upon prevailing market forces "was rendered 
grossly misleading by GFL's failure to disclose that it 
intended to short sell EquiMed and National Medical." Br. 
of Appellant at 48-49. 
 
We must reject Colkitt's argument for it is premised on 
the misguided notion that short sales distort markets and 
thus produce inaccurate, biased, and tainted market prices. 
As already explained, short sales executed in accordance 
with SEC rules and regulations not only are lawful, but also 
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do not distort markets or create a false impression of 
supply and demand because they are legitimate 
transactions with real buyers on the other side of the sale 
who are betting that the stock's price will rise. See Sullivan 
& Long, 47 F.3d at 864. Contrary to Colkitt's assertion, 
GFL's short sales did not render its guarantee misleading, 
and GFL consequently did not have a duty to disclose to 
Colkitt its intention to engage in short selling. Therefore, 
because Colkitt failed to create a genuine issue with respect 
to GFL making an omission of material fact, we will affirm 
summary judgment in favor of GFL with respect to the 
securities fraud claim. 
 
D. REINSTATEMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
 
Colkitt argues that the district court erred when it 
dismissed his amended counterclaims for lack of specificity 
on February 2, 1999. He simply states that he pled his 
amended counterclaims, which span 30 pages, with 
sufficient specificity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9. We need 
not consider these contentions, however, because, as we 
have explained, Colkitt failed to create genuine issues of 
material fact as to certain elements of his corresponding 
affirmative defenses, and thus, his counterclaims must fail 
on the merits as well. 
 
E. VIOLATIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWS 
 
1. Securities Claims 
 
Section 1-508 of the Pennsylvania Securities Act bars the 
basing of certain suits on contracts that violate state 
securities laws. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70,S 1-508 (1994). 
Section 1-401 of the Pennsylvania Securities Act prohibits 
the use of any "device, scheme or artifice to defraud" and 
the omission of any "material fact necessary in order to 
make statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading." Id.  S 1-401(a), (b). 
Finally, Pennsylvania common law permits "[t]he recipient 
of a misrepresentation [to] avoid the contract by showing 
that the misrepresentation was either fraudulent or 
material." Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson , 491 A.2d 
138, 141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). As GFL asserts, these 
provisions are "functionally identical" to Section 29(b) and 
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Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See Rosen v. 
Communication Serv. Group, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 310, 321 
n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Section 401 of the Pennsylvania 
Securities Act is modeled after Rule 10b-5 of the federal 
securities laws, and requires virtually the same elements of 
proof."). Therefore, Colkitt's state securities and common 
law fraud claims fail for the same reasons his federal 
securities claims fail. 
 
2. Breach of Contract Claim 
 
Colkitt argues that GFL is barred under Pennsylvania law 
from enforcing the notes because GFL committed a material 
breach of the contracts by refusing to accept Colkitt's 
prepayment, even though the notes contain no language 
prohibiting prepayment. Colkitt claims that he notified GFL 
in late December 1996 and early January 1997 that he 
would prepay all outstanding principal and interest on the 
notes, but GFL improperly rejected Colkitt's request for 
prepayment in hopes of declaring the notes in default and 
collecting millions of dollars in penalties. 
 
GFL responds that it did not outright reject Colkitt's 
request for prepayment, but conditionally accepted the 
prepayment offer while reserving its rights to dispute the 
balance due. GFL not only disagreed with Colkitt about the 
amounts due, but refused to allow Colkitt to dictate the 
terms of any prepayment. Because of its conditional 
acceptance of Colkitt's offer, GFL maintains that whether or 
not the notes permitted prepayment is not at issue. 14 GFL 
also argues that Colkitt's failure to tender any prepayments 
-- or any payments, for that matter -- undermines his 
position that he was attempting to make a full prepayment 
of outstanding principal and interest. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The district court, responding to Colkitt's assertion that the notes 
do 
not permit GFL either to reject or accept conditionally an offer of 
prepayment, stated that "nothing in the agreements requires GFL to 
accept prepayment in an amount unilaterally imposed by Colkitt." GFL 
Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, No. 4:CV-97-0526, Memorandum and 
Order at 24 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2000). Thus, the court concluded that 
"GFL's acceptance while reserving its rights to the disputed amount does 
not constitute a breach of contract." Id. 
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More importantly, however, Colkitt admitted that he was 
in material breach of his obligations on the notes before his 
first prepayment offer. In particular, he was in default on 
his interest obligations, he failed to maintain a pledge of 
securities in escrow, and he neglected to file required 
disclosure documents with the SEC. See Colkitt Dep. at 
272-73, 261-62, 195-97 (App. 000581-000582, 000577- 
000578, 000552-000554). In light of these prior breaches, 
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment 




The district court granted GFL damages in the amount of 
$21,121,989.39. Colkitt argues that the damages should be 
limited to principal and interest outstanding as of the date 
of his prepayment request, which would reduce the 
damages to $11,740,198. 
 
First, Colkitt believes that GFL forfeited its right to collect 
anything but principal and interest when it rejected 
Colkitt's prepayment offer. As already addressed, he 
maintains that GFL's refusal to accept prepayment 
constituted a breach of contract and that if GFL had 
accepted his prepayment offer as it allegedly was obligated 
to do, he would have owed only $11,740,198. Colkitt 
cannot prevail on this argument, however, as he never 
actually tendered the $11,740,198 prepayment. Depriving 
GFL of the interest and penalties due on a balance that 
Colkitt never paid would reward him unfairly for his breach 
by allowing him to hold onto GFL's money interest free for 
nearly four and a half years. 
 
Second, Colkitt argues that GFL is prohibited from 
recovering both the 20.5%/22% "premium" and the 14% 
"default interest" because they constitute an unenforceable 
penalty "that is disproportionate to the value of the 
performance promised or the injury that has actually 
occurred." Br. of Appellant at 64 (quoting Finkle v. Gulf & 
Western Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
Colkitt claims that the "premiums" exceed the profit GFL 
would have been able to earn had it exchanged all of the 
debt for shares of National Medical and EquiMed and sold 
the shares on the market. He also insists that adding 14% 
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"default interest" to the premiums is simply punitive and 
constitutes unenforceable liquidated damages. 
 
We reject Colkitt's request to reduce the damage award. 
Both the "premiums" and the "default interest" compensate 
GFL for distinct economic losses suffered by GFL as a 
result of Colkitt's breach. The 20.5% and 22% "premiums" 
represent the grossed-up value of the 17% and 18% 
discounts guaranteed in the notes. The premiums are 
intended to restore GFL to the position where it would have 
been if GFL had been able to convert all of the debt into 
National Medical and EquiMed stock. In contrast, the 
"default interest" is intended to compensate GFL for 
damages it incurred since Colkitt's breach -- namely, the 
deprivation of its money over the past four and a half years. 
Not only were these provisions included in contracts that 
were negotiated at arm's length, but contrary to Colkitt's 
assertions, they also would restore GFL to the position that 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the 
district court entered on April 25, 2000, and July 17, 2000. 
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